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The office of the Chief Justice of the United States has received
considerable renown but has been the subject of relatively little research. It is common to refer to the Chief as primus inter pares, but little attention has been paid to the relative significance of the primus as
opposed to the pares. The office of the Chief Justice has been considered “second in national authority and prestige only to the presi1
dent,” and is said to have “sweeping, if usually unstated, powers and
2
significance.” Yet the Chief Justice has relatively little actual authority
over the Associate Justices who serve contemporaneously, and the
“fact that a chief justice must work his will with eight independent
3
souls not chosen by him is a formidable barrier to his success.” Justice Frankfurter described the Supreme Court as an “institution in
4
More colorfully, thenwhich every man is his own sovereign.”
Associate Justice Rehnquist referred to Associate Justices as being “as
5
independent as hogs on ice.” Thus, the actual influence of the Chief
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Justice on the Court may be disputed and may vary over time depending on the particular composition of the bench and the personality
and inclinations of the individual Chief Justice.
The recent sad death of Chief Justice William Rehnquist has
prompted tributes to his influence on the Court as Chief Justice.
Mark Tushnet, the prominent liberal constitutional law professor, declared that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Earl Warren
were the twentieth century’s two great Chief Justices, as “[b]oth pre6
sided over courts that changed the law in a very dramatic way.” Professor A.E. Dick Howard suggested that “[w]e will look back on the
7
Rehnquist court as one of the smoothest in the court’s history.”
Linda Greenhouse of the New York Times declared that Justice
Rehnquist’s tenure as Chief was “one of the most consequential,” during which he “managed to translate many of his long-held views into
8
binding national precedent.” According to the Washington Post, judicial restraint will be the Rehnquist Court’s legacy, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s personal “considerable achievement” was his “effective9
ness as chief.”
Taking a slightly different perspective, however,
Greenhouse suggested that the Rehnquist Court’s legacy was the
10
growth of the Supreme Court’s own power.
Some disagreed with
claims about Justice Rehnquist’s influence, suggesting that “during
some of the most heated battles, rather than an influential chief rallying the court, Rehnquist was the court’s missing man, seeming to
11
watch from the sidelines.”
Thus, the impact of our most recent
Chief Justice appears still open to question.
A considerable amount of historical evidence, including that
drawn from judicial biographies, has provided critical information
about the role and responsibilities of the Chief Justice, as well as about
the influence of individual Chiefs over time. Like all anecdotal evi6

Charles Lane, The Rehnquist Legacy: 33 Years Turning Back the Court, WASH. POST,
Sept. 5, 2005, at A8.
7
Charles Lane & Fred Barbash, Two Vacancies Give Bush a Chance to Solidify Court’s
Right, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2005, at A9.
8
Linda Greenhouse, William H. Rehnquist, Architect of Conservative Court, Dies at 80,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at A16.
9
Editorial, The Rehnquist Era, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2005, at A30.
10
See Greenhouse, supra note 8, at A16 (“In the zero-sum game of the tripartite
separation of powers, the Supreme Court’s own power grew correspondingly as the
[Rehnquist Court] justices circumscribed the power of Congress.”).
11
Cliff Sloan, Editorial, A Limited Legacy, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2005, at A31. Sloan
pointed to affirmative action, the Establishment Clause, abortion, and defendants’
rights as areas where Rehnquist failed to influence the Court, but conceded that some
influence could be found in federalism questions. Id.
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dence, however, its reliability is uncertain. Such evidence can mislead
by failing to uncover systematic trends or by relying on selective and
unrepresentative stories. More rigorous quantitative empirical research on the role of the Chief Justice has been relatively sparse, although what does exist has provided some important insights.
This Article provides some additional empirical evidence on the
effects of the Chief on the Court’s deliberations, as well as the effects
of elevation to the position on the Chief himself. We investigate
whether decision-making trends on the Supreme Court shifted when
Justice Rehnquist replaced Chief Justice Warren Burger. In particular, we consider changes in ideological trends in Court outcomes, cohesion among the Justices, and the Court’s docket. In addition, we
evaluate the extent to which Justice Rehnquist altered his own behavior following his elevation to Chief Justice in 1986.
I. THE POWER OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE: EXISTING EVIDENCE
Some existing research addresses the role and influence of the
Chief Justice. Various analyses have considered the sources of the
Chief’s institutional powers and the potential influence these powers
12
enable the Chief to exercise over his fellow Justices. These analyses
typically look to anecdotal examples in support of their claims; this research is addressed in Part A. While relatively little rigorous quantitative research has addressed the role of the Chief Justice, Part B reviews
the research that does exist.
A. Institutional Powers
The Chief Justice may cast only one vote of nine in individual
cases, the same as the other members of the Court. Nevertheless, the
Chief does enjoy certain institutional powers that might be used to
steer the Court in a particular direction. The Chief Justice serves as
the Court’s titular leader, as well as its actual leader in important respects. For example, she presides over conference deliberations and,
when in the majority, assigns the opinion. The Chief Justice is also
given several administrative powers that other Justices do not possess,
and these might be implemented in a fashion that would give the
12

One fine review of this research is found in Sue Davis, The Chief Justice and Judicial Decision-Making: The Institutional Basis for Leadership on the Supreme Court, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 135 (Cornell
W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) [hereinafter SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING].
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Chief some influence over the Court as a whole. This Part examines
some of those influences and how they might create some power to
affect case outcomes.
First, the Chief presides over oral argument and the subsequent
conference at which the Justices vote on case outcomes. This enables
her to speak first and provides her with the option to vote last on con13
tested cases. The authority to speak first conveys an agenda-setting
power that may be quite important because it enables the Chief to “di14
rect discussion and frame alternatives.”
Indeed, Chief Justice
Rehnquist regarded the ability to speak first and structure the legal
15
arguments as a key “advantage” of his position. He also stressed that
“what the conference shapes up like is pretty much what the chief jus16
tice makes it.”
Jefferson Powell suggested that Chief Justice
Rehnquist took advantage of this authority and “shifted the center of
17
the discussion.”
Occasionally, the Chief Justice may be able to take advantage of
18
the Condorcet paradox to manipulate the outcome. This paradox,
amplified in Arrow’s famous Theorem, involves nontransitive prefer19
ences. A majority may prefer option A to B, option B to C, but option C to A. In this case, the resolution of the decision is entirely dependent on the order in which the dichotomous options are
considered, thus providing the agenda-setter with considerable power
over outcomes. The probability that such a set of manipulable prefer20
ences exists in a given case is not high, however, and even the low
probability is eliminated when preferences are “single-peaked,” such

13

WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 82 (1964). The voting
order has changed over time at the Court. DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 204-05 (6th ed. 2003). The Chief Justice may
pass, though, to avoid early commitment or change his vote after other votes are cast.
14
BAUM, supra note 3, at 165.
15
Rehnquist, supra note 5, at 647.
16
O’BRIEN, supra note 13, at 200 (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist).
17
Richard W. Garnett, Right On, LEGAL AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 34 (quoting Jefferson Powell, Professor, Duke Law School).
18
See MURPHY, supra note 13, at 85-87 (describing “[t]he voting paradox [that]
might take place in a decision-making body where more than two alternatives . . . [are]
available to the group.”).
19
DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 48-51 (1991).
20
See KENNETH A. SHEPSLE & MARK S. BONCHEK, ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND INSTITUTIONS 52-53 (1997) (noting that over ninety percent of
preference configurations are not so manipulable, when a group of three persons
chooses among three alternatives).
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21

as when they are ideologically driven. Yet the Chief may also be able
to take advantage of characteristics of the Court beyond the existence
of any intransitive preferences. By controlling the conference, for example, the Chief may be able to pick the most strategic time to call a
vote, such as when a swing vote appears to be leaning in the desired
direction. Furthermore, like any chairperson, the Chief can exercise
some control over the content of the discussion at the conference.
Some Chiefs have used this control to their advantage: Chief Justice
Hughes, for example, was known for dominating conference delibera22
tions.
Policymakers’ ability to manipulate outcomes through agendasetting or issue-structuring is known as heresthetics, a word William
Riker coined and defined as the ability of a “prospective loser to rear23
range politics to his or her advantage.” Riker wrote extensively on
such strategic actions, illustrated by historical examples of strategies
24
used by politicians to influence policy outcomes. A Chief Justice may
similarly use this power by “constructing choice situations in order to
manipulate outcomes—most notably, by adding alternatives, control25
ling the agenda, and voting in a sophisticated fashion.” One study
indicates that the nature of the sequential voting at conference enables strategic behavior to influence outcomes and that the Chief Jus26
tice has engaged in such behavior to a statistically significant degree.
The Chief may also have other tools at her disposal to shape the
Court’s decision making. For example, in Brown v. Board of Educa27
tion, Chief Justice Warren strategically used his authority to separate
28
the merits from the remedy in order to secure a unanimous opinion.

21

FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 19, at 48.
See MURPHY, supra note 13, at 87 (describing how Chief Justice Hughes dominated conferences “armed both with heavily marked volumes of the U.S. Reports and a
photographic memory”).
23
William H. Riker, Heresthetic and Rhetoric in the Spatial Model, in ADVANCES IN THE
SPATIAL THEORY OF VOTING 46, 50 (James M. Enelow & Melvin J. Hinich eds., 1990).
24
For more on Riker’s heresthetic theories, see WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE ART OF
POLITICAL MANIPULATION (1986); William H. Riker, The Heresthetics of ConstitutionMaking: The Presidency in 1787, with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice, 78 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 1 (1984).
25
Lee Epstein & Olga Shvetsova, Heresthetical Maneuvering on the U.S. Supreme Court,
14 J. THEORETICAL POL. 93, 93-94 (2002).
26
See Kirk Randazzo et al., Strategic and Sequential Voting During the Burger
Court (2002) (Research Paper, Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
27
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF 90-91 (1983).
22
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The Chief’s functional heresthetic authority at conference may be
limited, however, at least in modern times. If all the Justices have
made up their minds about the case prior to the conference deliberations, they may not be subject to much strategic manipulation. In
contemporary conferences at the Court, there is little “give and take”
29
among the Justices, and minds appear to be already made up. Justice Scalia once declared that the conference was less an interchange
than it was a statement of the independent views of each individual
30
Justice. Empirical studies of voting fluidity on the Court have not
specifically addressed the effect of the conference but have found
relatively little change in the votes of the Justices at various stages of
the decision-making process. Segal and Spaeth find that strong fluidity—where Justices switch their votes over the course of the decisionmaking process—rarely occurs, and “when it does it disproportionately happens because most of the justices switch their votes to avoid a
31
decision on the merits of the controversy.”
Moreover, evidence supporting a strong association between the
individual Justices’ ideologies and their voting behavior calls into
question the extent to which votes may be influenced at conference or
otherwise. Where the Justices’ votes are essentially predetermined by
their ideological and policy preferences, little room exists for other
factors—including the potential influence of the Chief Justice—to
shape their decisions. Political scientists frequently maintain that the
ideological character of the Justices’ individual voting behavior re32
mains largely stable over time, although some quantitative evidence
suggests that several Justices’ preferences have shifted during their
33
tenure on the Court. One study in particular found that while most
Justices’ preferences remained unaltered over a long periods of time
(Justice Brennan, for example, remained consistently liberal and Justice Powell remained consistently conservative), for a few Justices a
dramatic change was observable. Justice Black’s voting record became
steadily more liberal for years until he exhibited a sudden shift to the
right at the end of his tenure on the Court, while Justice Douglas be29

O’BRIEN, supra note 13, at 258.
Davis, supra note 12, at 145.
31
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 287 (2002).
32
See, e.g., Lawrence Baum, Measuring Policy Change in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 905, 911 n.2 (1988).
33
See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., Do Political Preferences Change? A Longitudinal Study of
U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 60 J. POL. 801, 810 (1998) (noting the shift in Justice Blackmun’s liberalism and Justice Reed’s conservatism over time).
30
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gan as a moderate liberal and later became the most liberal of the Justices. Similarly, Justice Blackmun’s voting became progressively more
34
liberal the longer he served on the Court. The study did not suggest, however, that these shifts were linked in any way to the influence
of the Chief Justice.
The Chief may also potentially influence the Court’s policymaking
at the case selection stage. The Chief Justice controls the conferences
in which the Justices determine which cases to accept on writ of cer35
tiorari.
This authority may produce a greater impact than the
Chief’s presiding authority over the conference in which the Justices
vote on the merits. Given the vast number of cert petitions, individual
Justices are less able to attend carefully to individual cases, so they may
be more willing to defer to the Chief’s leadership. Moreover, the
Chief Justice creates the “discuss list” that generally determines the
36
petitions that the Court considers fully, although other Justices may
37
add cases to this list if they choose. According to one scholar, Chief
Justice Rehnquist used this authority to “push[] into the mainstream
once idiosyncratic views of state sovereignty and limited federal
38
power.” This ability to shape the Court’s docket certainly could have
contributed to what some scholars have claimed to be his success in
39
“shaping the law in selected areas that are central to his agenda.”
Another matter decided at the certiorari stage is the simple number of cases that the Court will accept for hearing on the merits. The
Chief Justice is said to “disproportionately influence policy over . . .

34

Id. at 811 fig.3.
See O’BRIEN, supra note 13, at 198-207 (discussing this process under Chief Justice Rehnquist and how he changed the procedures from previous Courts).
36
BAUM, supra note 3, at 107.
37
See John Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 13
(1983) (describing the Chief Justice’s practice of circulating “a list of cases that he
deems worthy of discussion [to which] each of the other members of the Court may
add cases”). In practice, though, the Chief Justice is predominant in determining the
cases discussed. See Gregory A. Caldeira et al., Sophisticated Judicial Behavior:
Agenda-Setting Via the Discuss List 11, 39-40 tbl.1 (Aug. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (showing that in the
1990 Term Chief Justice Rehnquist placed more cases on the discuss list—fifty-eight
percent—than all the other Justices combined). Historically, the Chief’s control was
even greater; Chief Justice Warren placed ninety-five percent of the cases on the discuss list. Id. at 10.
38
Garnett, supra note 17, at 34; see also Lane, supra note 6, at A9 (quoting Dean
John C. Jeffries of the University of Virginia Law School as stating, “You can’t identify
anyone who’s had more to do with the revival of federalism than Bill Rehnquist”).
39
See Davis, supra note 12, at 142-43 (citing the law of habeas corpus as well as federalism decisions as examples of Rehnquist’s successful law-shaping).
35
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40

the size of the docket.” The number of cases decided by the Court
has fluctuated considerably over the years, and the Rehnquist Court is
41
known for its paucity of decisions. Indeed, in recent years, the Court
has decided only about half as many cases as it once did, a reduction
made more remarkable by the dramatic increase in circuit court cases
42
during this same time period. The cause of this “incredibly shrink43
ing docket” has been debated by commentators. Sue Davis suggests
it may be attributed to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concern for Court
“efficiency” and his “strategy to reduce the role of the Court and to let
conservative decisions of Reagan-Bush-packed lower federal courts
44
stand.” The latter explanations are probably not complete, however,
because by affirming the conservative decisions of lower courts, the
Supreme Court could amplify their power while reducing its own role
through limiting language, thereby accomplishing the same goal
through a completely different method—accepting more cert petitions. Thus, the shrunken docket remains something of a mystery.
Yet even at the certiorari level, the influence of the Chief Justice
45
may be limited by circumstances and Associate Justice preferences.
Just as in decision making, the Chief has only a single vote of nine on
the decision whether to grant or deny certiorari. It is now wellestablished that the certiorari decision is an ideological and strategic
one, in which individual Justices calculate the likely consequences of

40

Mauro, supra note 2, at 10.
See, e.g., Davis, supra note 12, at 146 (“[D]uring the 1995 term the Court decided only seventy-five cases, less than half of the 175 decided in the 1984 term and the
lowest number since the 1953 term.”); Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the
Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403, 430 (noting that as Chief Justice, Rehnquist
has been more willing to reject cases for review with holdings with which he disagrees
but which have little precedential value).
42
See JEFFREY A. SEGAL ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 222 fig.9.2 (2005) (displaying graphically the increase in cases filed in circuit
court, which exceeded twenty-five percent between 1992 and 2003).
43
See, e.g., Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court’s
Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 750-93 (2001) (discussing various theories
explaining the reduced docket and analyzing them using data on conference votes);
Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 557-59 (1998) (reviewing LEE
EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998)) (suggesting reasons for
the reduced docket).
44
Davis, supra note 12, at 146. Rehnquist clearly “moved to trim the Court’s
docket.” Mauro, supra note 2, at 11.
45
See Davis, supra note 12, at 147 (noting that “the complex interaction between
the outcome and jurisprudential modes among his eight colleagues is likely to diminish his ability to secure the three necessary votes to grant certiorari”).
41
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46

the Court taking up a case. While the Chief has some informational
power over this decision, she has no specific powers to control the
agenda that would enable her to control certiorari decisions in the
face of a willful opposition.
The most commonly considered and apparently influential power
of the Chief Justice is the authority to assign opinion writing when in
the majority. Although the Chief Justice votes first—the Court votes
in order of seniority—he may strategically pass in order to ensure
47
membership in the majority if desired. The Chief Justice may assign
opinion writing to the individual Justice best able to hold together a
fragile coalition, to an ideologically amenable colleague, or to himself.
This power has been called the position’s “single most influential
48
function,” a conclusion based on a belief that “opinion authors have
49
a disproportionate influence on the content of an opinion.” Moreover, the Chief’s assignment power may provide other forms of leverage over the other Justices. In theory, the Chief Justice may also use
her position to punish or reward Justices for whatever reason she
50
chooses. Nevertheless, strategic assignments do not always produce
perfect outcomes from the standpoint of the Chief and may even
51
blowback and disadvantage her interests.
Even independent of specific structural leadership powers, the
very title of “Chief Justice” may provide an amorphous source of lead46

See SEGAL ET AL., supra note 42, at 285-89 (describing this strategic calculus and
presenting empirical information on how individual Justices have employed it); see also
Davis, supra note 12, at 147 (observing that the decision involves strategic considerations “including whether the case is a good vehicle or whether there is likely to be a
better case for pulling a swing justice and for achieving one’s long-range goals”).
47
See Timothy R. Johnson et al., Passing and Strategic Voting on the U.S. Supreme
Court, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 349, 357 (2005) (discussing how requiring a minimum
four-member coalition to grant certiorari increases uncertainty and renders the Chief
Justice more prone to delay his vote).
48
O’BRIEN, supra note 13, at 269.
49
Forrest Maltzman et al., Strategy and Judicial Choice: New Institutionalist Approaches
to Supreme Court Decision-making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING, supra note 12, at
43, 53.
50
When Justice Souter was asked why he joined Chief Justice Rehnquist in singing
carols at the annual Christmas party of the Court, he explained, “I have to. Otherwise
I get all the tax cases.” Tony Mauro, Courtside, The Highs and Lows of the 1992 Court, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 28, 1992, at 12, 14. While he was presumably joking, he “touched on
an important reality.” BAUM, supra note 3, at 166. Justice Blackmun reported that a
Justice in Chief Justice Burger’s “doghouse” would be assigned a “crud” opinion “that
nobody wants to write.” Id.
51
See Cross, supra note 43, at 517-19 (discussing the complexity of opinion assignment and backlash by other Justices against Chief Justice Burger’s obvious strategic
ploys to control assignments).

1674

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 154: 1665

ership authority. Walter Murphy suggests that “there is an expectation that a titular leader will exert both task and social leadership,” so
that a “Chief Justice generally has an initial psychological advantage
over any Associate Justice in a struggle for influence within the
52
Court.” Chief Justices have employed a wide array of different lead53
ership styles throughout history. For example, Chief Justice Hughes
reportedly ran the conference like a drill sergeant, while Chief Justice
Stone ran conferences loosely, allowing lengthy debates among the
54
Justices.
Chief Justice Warren’s success has been attributed to his
55
collegial leadership qualities, in comparison to Chief Justice Burger,
who reportedly had “limited impact” due to his lack of effective lead56
ership skills. A seminal study has analyzed this leadership role for
57
several past Chief Justices.
Thus, while the unique attributes of being the Chief Justice might
seem to convey some special power, the extent of that power is unclear and may vary from Chief to Chief. As Chief Justice Chase declared:
[The Chief] is but one of eight judges, each of whom has the same powers as himself. His judgment has no more weight, and his vote no more
importance, than those of his brethren. He presides, and a good deal of
58
extra labor is thrown upon him. That’s all.

Chief Justice Stone suggested that the Chief may be disadvantaged,
compared to the other Justices, as the one who “has to do the things
59
that the janitor will not do.” Chief Justices apparently do not feel
empowered to direct the Court.
The Chief Justice has also increasingly been assigned administrative duties for the federal judiciary, in an amount that is “almost over-

52

MURPHY, supra note 13, at 83.
See generally STEAMER, supra note 1 (breaking down the leadership styles of all
the Chief Justices).
54
Id. at 27-28.
55
BAUM, supra note 3, at 166-67.
56
Id. at 167.
57
David J. Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process of the Supreme Court, in AMERICAN COURT SYSTEMS: READINGS IN JUDICIAL PROCESS AND BEHAVIOR 506 (Sheldon Goldman & Austin Sarat eds., 1978) (comparing the relative implementation of the leadership role in taking cases, hearing oral argument, conferencing,
and creating unanimity of Chief Justices Taft, Hughes, and Stone).
58
Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Chief Justice of the United States: Primus Inter Pares, 17
J. PUB. L. 20, 22 (1968).
59
ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 281
(1956).
53
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60

whelming.” Some of these powers are obviously significant, such as
the ability to select the judges who in turn select a special prosecutor
61
to investigate administration figures. One significant administrative
power is probably the Chief’s role in lobbying for the federal judiciary’s budget and other matters of concern (such as caseload limitations). It is unlikely, however, that much connection exists between
these administrative duties and case outcomes. Indeed, the increasing
“burden of administrative duties” may even hamper the Chief Justice’s
62
ability to influence decision making.
One study has drawn a connection between the Chief Justice’s
budgetary and lobbying responsibilities and the Court’s decisions, im63
plicitly affirming the Chief Justice’s influence over case outcomes.
Eugenia Toma hypothesizes that Congress uses its appropriation authority to signal its approval or disapproval of the ideological pattern
of Supreme Court opinions, and that the Chief Justice takes these signals and correspondingly modifies the pattern of opinions in order to
better conform to congressional preferences and thereby increase the
judicial budget. Her study of budgets and decisions between 1946 and
1988 found that the larger the distance between Court ideology and
congressional ideology, the smaller the budget increase. Then, for
several Chief Justices during the period, the Court responded by pro64
ducing decisions more in line with congressional preferences.
In
contrast, subsequent and more detailed research has suggested that
there is little relationship between congressional preferences and Su65
preme Court decisions.
Regardless of this budgetary connection, the Chief Justice’s administrative authority can affect the conditions of service on the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Burger modernized and expanded the
66
administration of the Court and redecorated its facilities. Chief Jus60

STEAMER, supra note 1, at 14. Chief Justice Warren described his schedule as
“backbreaking,” with his mornings filled by administrative responsibilities. Id. at 17.
61
See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (discussing Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s role in the investigation and impeachment of President Clinton).
62
BAUM, supra note 3, at 165.
63
See Eugenia F. Toma, A Contractual Model of the Voting Behavior of the Supreme
Court: The Role of the Chief Justice, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 433, 434 (1996) (“The [Supreme Court and Congress] enter into a contract of budgetary favors in exchange for
politically influenced output.”).
64
Id. at 441-43.
65
See Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and
Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28, 35 (1997) (concluding that evidence that the Supreme Court responds to congressional preferences is “far from convincing”).
66
STEAMER, supra note 1, at 177-78.
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tice Warren unsuccessfully sought appropriations for cars and drivers
67
for the Justices and these efforts were “appreciated” by his brethren.
While we don’t know if the Chief Justice receives any decisional “payback” for her administrative efforts, such an effect is plausible.
Whether or not the Chief Justice’s lobbying and administrative
budgetary role affects specific Court decisions, it may still have a
broader policy impact. The Chief serves as chairman of the Judicial
Conference of the United States and makes its committee assignments. The Judicial Conference is composed of circuit court and district court judges who choose issues of interest to the judiciary to
bring before Congress. Chief Justice Rehnquist strategically used this
authority to obtain Judicial Conference recommendations tightening
68
habeas corpus relief. Such action can provoke legislation that has an
indirect effect on judicial decisions and an even more direct effect on
the Court’s docket.
Federal statutes also assign to the Chief Justice other potentially
69
significant appointment powers. Most prominent among these powers is the ability to appoint judges to specialized courts, including the
70
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, the Alien Terrorist Removal
71
72
Court, and the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. The potential exists for the Chief to use this appointment power strategically
73
to achieve political ends.
Moreover, these powers have expanded
74
over time, and Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist have appointed
75
scores of judges to special tribunals.
Chief Justices have other extrajudicial sources of authority as well.
Occasionally, the constitutional power of the Chief Justice to preside

67

Id. at 19.
David C. Nixon, Policy-Making by Different Means: The Chief Justice’s Attempts to
Shape Policy Through the Judicial Conference of the United States, 15 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y
345, 356-57 (2003).
69
For an excellent discussion and critique of these powers, see Theodore W.
Ruger, The Judicial Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 341 (2004).
70
See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)-(d) (Supp. 2002) (giving the Chief Justice power to appoint eleven judges, and setting the tenures of those judges).
71
See 8 U.S.C. § 1532(a) (2000) (stipulating the Chief Justice’s appointment powers to establish a removal court).
72
See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (2000) (giving the Chief Justice power to designate
seven circuit court and district court judges to sit on the panel).
73
Ruger, supra note 69, at 390.
74
See id. at 351 (describing the “gradual accretion of the Chief’s appointment authority”).
75
See id. at 390 (observing that Burger and Rehnquist appointed over 125 judges
to these panels).
68
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76

over impeachment proceedings may become substantial, as when
Chief Justice Rehnquist presided over the impeachment trial of Presi77
dent Clinton. Until recently, the Ethics in Government Act empowered the Chief Justice to assign judges to a special division of the D.C.
Circuit created for the purpose of appointing independent counsels
78
to investigate the executive. The latter power became quite significant when the judges of the special division removed Robert Fiske, the
original counsel investigating Whitewater during the Clinton Admini79
stration, and replaced him with Kenneth Starr. This action was politically controversial and may have tainted the subsequent impeach80
ment proceedings against President Clinton.
All of these powers
could conceivably translate into some additional influence over decisions, but the connection seems relatively remote.
In addition to formal legal powers, both judicial and extrajudicial,
Chief Justices have assumed responsibility for Court cohesion. Past
Chiefs’ successes in this regard may be measured in part by their ability to produce unanimous or near-unanimous decisions, since such
decisions seem more authoritative and yield more respect for a rul81
ing. Chief Justice Taft wrote that he was “expected to promote team82
work by the Court, so as to give weight and solidarity to its opinions.”
The ability to produce unanimous decisions in controversial cases,

76

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
For a brief discussion of this role, see Jonathan Turley, Senate Trials and Factional
Disputes: Impeachment as a Madisonian Device, 49 DUKE L.J. 1, 101 n.478 (1999).
78
28 U.S.C. § 49(d) (2000).
79
See Susan Schmidt, Judges Replace Fiske as Whitewater Counsel: Ex-Solicitor General
Starr To Take Over Probe, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1994, at A1 (discussing the controversy
surrounding this decision). For a review of the occurrence and its fallout, see John Q.
Barrett, Special Division Agonistes, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 17, 33-38 (2000).
80
See Fred H. Altshuler, Comparing the Nixon and Clinton Impeachments, 51 HASTINGS
L.J. 745, 750 (2000) (describing the Starr appointment as “suspect from the outset” for
Clinton supporters). Critics charged that the special division was partisan. See, e.g.,
Abbe D. Lowell, Starr Flap Shows Need for Reform, NAT’L L.J., May 13, 1996, at A19 (noting that the choice of Republicans by both Attorney General Reno and the Special
Court was “based on the assumption that an attorney from the party not in office will
not overlook any wrongdoing”). For a brief history of the appointment controversy,
see John Q. Barrett, Independent Counsel Law Improvements for the Next Five Years, 51
ADMIN. L. REV. 631, 646-47 (1999).
81
See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 106 (1998) (discussing an important school desegregation ruling and the Justices’ understanding that
“a unanimous opinion in such a major case would have a greater chance of remaining
undisturbed by external political actors than a divided opinion”).
82
MURPHY, supra note 13, at 83.
77
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84

such as Brown and United States v. Nixon , are often regarded as vital,
since the “decisions would have lost much of their authority had there
been dissenting opinions around which the opposition might have ral85
lied.” Chief Justice Hughes attempted “to secure as great a degree of
unanimity as was possible without compromising the integrity of the
86
majority opinion.”
Indeed, each additional vote for the majority
opinion, even short of unanimity, appears to have some functional
87
power. Chief Justices have differed in the importance they place on
this virtue, however, and Chief Justice Stone may even have consid88
ered cohesiveness a negative.
In general, however, “chief justices
display a special level of institutional concern” for producing larger
89
majority opinions.
This responsibility may not be welcomed by the Chief, however,
since it requires the Chief Justice to “spend much precious time and
energy in cajoling his colleagues” or to “join the majority even when
90
in disagreement with it.” In this sense, the position of Chief Justice
may produce “golden shackles” that limit the Chief’s individual freedom. In particular, the Chief’s responsibility to promote Court cohesion may constitute a special burden if it reduces the ideological
power of the Chief Justice. The Chief may have to compromise her
preferences in order to build a greater majority or control the assignment of the opinion. According to one commentator, for example,

83

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
85
STEAMER, supra note 1, at 25; see also RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE
HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY 694-99 (1975) (discussing Chief Justice Warren’s efforts to achieve unanimity and avoid even concurring opinions in Brown); Charles M. Lamb & Lisa K. Parshall,
United States v. Nixon Revisited: A Case Study in Supreme Court Decision-Making, 58 U.
PITT. L. REV. 71, 107-08 (1996) (suggesting that the Court’s desire to make Nixon
unanimous was intended to give the President no excuse for noncompliance).
86
Edwin McElwain, The Business of the Supreme Court as Conducted by Chief Justice
Hughes, 63 HARV. L. REV. 5, 19 (1949).
87
See Cross, supra note 43, at 555-56 (noting that this may explain why 5-4 opinions are exceptional, as most winning coalitions contain more than the necessary five
Justices).
88
See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text (examining Chief Justice Stone’s
leadership of the Court).
89
SEGAL ET AL., supra note 42, at 336.
90
STEAMER, supra note 1, at 25.
84

2006]

DECISIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE

1679

Justice Rehnquist became more “muted and focused” upon ascending
91
to the position of Chief Justice.
The influence of the Chief Justice on case outcomes is thus unclear in the sense that she enjoys no unique institutional powers sufficient to enable him to drive the Court in a particular ideological direction, at least in individual cases. On the other hand, at the
margins, her authority—via docket composition and majority opinion
assignment—may be sufficient to shift the Court’s decisions in a particular direction over time, assuming she has sufficient allies on the
Court who support her agenda. In that sense, her influence is clearly
contingent and conditional, rather than direct.
B. Empirical Research on the Influence of the Chief Justice
While only limited empirical research on the influence of the
Chief Justice on the Court’s decision making exists, some analyses
have begun to emerge. Opinion assignment has been most studied
because it is the most direct and readily observable power of the Chief
Justice. The conclusions drawn from these studies are mixed, but the
best research shows that “in some cases the Chief’s assignments appear to be designed to further his policy objectives, while in other
cases assignments reflect concerns about the smooth operation of the
92
Court.” The ability to assign opinions is constrained by the need to
balance opinion writing among the Justices and by external considera93
tions as well.
In addition, it is unclear that opinion assignment necessarily controls the content of the opinion. The writer must accommodate the
other Justices in the majority. One empirical study suggests that the
91

Lane, supra note 6, at A9 (quoting Professor Dennis Hutchinson); see also
Mauro, supra note 2, at 10 (quoting Professor Ruger as saying that Rehnquist “moderated when he became chief justice”).
92
FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME 35 (2000). An earlier study reached similar findings. Chief Justice assignments of civil liberty opinions during the Warren Court suggested that opinions
were assigned to ideologically compatible Justices, though this effect was limited somewhat by concern for external reaction. David W. Rohde, Policy Goals, Strategic Choice
and Majority Opinion Assignments in the U.S. Supreme Court, 16 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 652,
677-78 (1972). However, this pattern did not exist for economic cases before the Warren Court. Gregory James Rathjen, Policy Goals, Strategic Choice, and Majority Opinion
Assignments in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Replication, 18 AM. J. POL. SCI. 713, 719 (1974).
93
Sometimes the identity of an opinion author may render the decision more acceptable. For example, Chief Justice Hughes would assign decisions striking down
New Deal statutes to more liberal Justices, such as Justice Brandeis. David J. Danelski,
Conflict and Its Resolution in the Supreme Court, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 71, 78 (1967).

1680

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 154: 1665

substantive content is controlled by the median member of the major94
ity coalition, regardless of who drafts the opinion. If so, the opinion
assignment authority provides relatively little power to the Chief. Arguably, the existing research has focused unduly on the opinion assignment power, at the expense of other sources of influence of the
95
Chief Justice.
Some quantitative evidence demonstrates the influence of the
Chief Justice during the certiorari process as well. As noted above, the
Chief has predominant influence over the discuss list of cases to be
96
considered by the Court. Moreover, certiorari is more likely to be
granted in those cases selected by the Chief. In the 1990 Term, 37.6%
of the cases chosen by the Chief Justice were selected for certiorari,
97
while the highest rate for any other Justice was 20%. Indeed, 78.6%
of the cases heard that Term came from Chief Justice Rehnquist’s se98
lections. Strategically used, this authority could give the Chief considerable agenda-setting power.
Other empirical evidence might permit an inference of the Chief
Justice’s influence on Court cohesion. Paul Edelman and Suzanna
Sherry have examined the size of majority coalitions in several natural
99
courts.
Their data revealed that Rehnquist Court majorities were
more successful in winning over the final Justice to gain a unanimous
100
opinion than were Burger or Warren Court majorities.
This is not
strong evidence of a Chief Justice effect, however, because of numer101
ous other differences among those Courts.

94

See Chad Westerland, Who Owns the Majority Opinion? An Examination of Policy Making on the U.S. Supreme Court 29-30 (Aug. 29, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (finding that the probability of Justices writing separate opinions was predicted by their ideological distance
from the median member of the majority, not by their ideological distance from the
opinion author).
95
See Davis, supra note 12, at 140 (observing that it was “unfortunate” that so much
research focuses on opinion assignment, thereby presenting an “incomplete” picture
of the Chief’s leadership).
96
See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text (explaining the importance of the
discuss list in the certiorari process).
97
Caldeira et al., supra note 37, at 23.
98
Id. at 24.
99
Paul H. Edelman & Suzanna Sherry, All or Nothing: Explaining the Size of Supreme
Court Majorities, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1225 (2000).
100
Id. at 1241-42.
101
Id. at 1245 (noting, for example, that “over the course of four decades, the Supreme Court changes in many ways” and that “[t]he personalities of the individual Justices and their interactions with one another are different for each Court”).
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On the other hand, there is compelling evidence that the Chief
Justice has affected the norm of separate opinion writing. For the first
150 years of U.S. history, Supreme Court opinions were characterized
by consensus, with relatively few concurring and dissenting opinions.
“In the early 1940s, however, the conventions of the Court radically
changed,” and the number of dissenting and concurring opinions
102
“surged to unprecedented levels.”
An empirical study of this
change found that it could not be attributed to changes in jurisdiction
103
or caseload or the Court’s ideological composition.
Instead, the
change seemed to be due to the leadership style and ability of Chief
104
Justice Stone.
A subsequent empirical analysis of the data similarly concluded
that the rise in separate opinions was due to the leadership of the
105
Chief Justice or lack thereof.
Data on such independent opinions
shows considerable variation over time, with statistically significant dif106
ferences mainly in the Hughes and Stone Courts. While the authors
of these studies have successfully ruled out other logical explanations
for the increase of independent opinions, they could not exclude the
possibility that the change was due simply to the broader tenor of the
legal times and to the growth of legal realism, both of which were co107
incident with the increased number of separate opinions. Nevertheless, the results suggest a Chief Justice effect.
This historical analysis suggests that the Chief Justice has some
ability to define the Court’s culture and norms, which may dramatically influence the Court’s functioning. That culture may be one of
collegiality in which Justices are more likely to join majority opinions,
even if they have some disagreement with their language or even results. At this point, however, it is unclear that a Chief Justice has the
power to reverse the frequency of dissents and concurrences. Once
the Pandora’s Box was opened by Chief Justice Stone, the Chief’s ability to influence independent decision making by Associate Justices
may have become quite limited.

102

Thomas G. Walker et al., On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms in the
United States Supreme Court, 50 J. POL. 361, 362 (1988).
103
Id. at 364-78.
104
Id. at 378-80.
105
Stacia L. Haynie, Leadership and Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 54 J. POL.
1158, 1165-66 (1992). Haynie found that the increase in concurring opinions largely
occurred under Justice Hughes, while dissents rose under Justice Stone. Id. at 1164.
106
Id. at 1163-65.
107
Davis, supra note 12, at 144.
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In terms of decisional influence, therefore, the effect of the Chief
Justice might appear in several ways. The Chief might exert a gravitational pull on decisions of the full Court or on those of particular Associate Justices. The Chief might more successfully mold larger majorities in support of an opinion. The Chief could have influence over
the nature of cases accepted on certiorari or simply the number of
cases accepted. These influences have seen limited investigation,
however, and this article strives to supplement this investigation with
additional empirical evidence, focusing on the potential effect of
Chief Justice Rehnquist.
II. THE 2004 TERM
We begin with an analysis of a unique natural experiment that
arose during the 2004 Term, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist fell ill
with thyroid cancer and stopped presiding over the Court for four
108
months.
During this time, Justice Stevens took over as Acting Chief
Justice. Justice Rehnquist neither attended oral argument nor, presumably, the conference vote on the cases immediately following oral
109
argument, over which Justice Stevens presided.
Justice Rehnquist
did not participate in decisions for the first month of his absence but
110
cast votes on cases in the succeeding months.
This episode offers a
natural, if brief, experiment on the influence of the Chief Justice,
both because the number of cases in both sets is roughly equal, and
because Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens are considered ideological opposites.
Relatively little press discussion focused on the effect of Justice
Rehnquist’s absence, save for a suggestion that it might have delayed
111
the writing of opinions.
Others suggested there might be a greater

108

See Tony Mauro, Illness Keeps Rehnquist From the Bench, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 8,
2004, at 10. The Chief Justice underwent significant surgery for thyroid cancer in late
October, which was followed by radiation and chemotherapy treatments. Id. The
Chief Justice temporarily left the Court in November 2004 and resumed his duties in
March 2005.
109
See Linda Greenhouse, While Rehnquist Is Treated, Life at the Court Proceeds, but
With Sadness and Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2004, at A25 (describing how Justice
Stevens, as the senior Associate Justice, presided “over courtroom sessions and the justices’ private conferences”).
110
The Chief Justice initially sought to return to work after just the first month but
was medically unable to do so. Linda Greenhouse & Katharine Q. Seelye, Rehnquist
Fails to Return, and Speculation Increases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2004, at A1.
111
See Tony Mauro, Waiting Game Continues on Sentencing, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 20,
2004, at 10.
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impact. At an ABA convention, Kenneth Starr and other panelists
suggested that the ascendancy of Justice Stevens to Acting Chief Justice caused the Court to issue more liberal opinions, a thesis discussed
112
at the Volokh Conspiracy blog.
The suggestion was based only on anecdotal evidence, however. This Part examines whether the switch
from Chief Justice Rehnquist to Acting Chief Justice Stevens actually
appeared to make a difference.
We examined all cases decided with full opinions during the Supreme Court’s 2004 Term, including the closely divided decision in
Medellin v. Dretke, which dismissed the petitioner’s writ of certiorari as
113
improvidently granted.
Justice Stevens presided over forty cases in
this set; Chief Justice Rehnquist presided over thirty.
We first analyze the Chief’s success at promoting court cohesion.
One might expect that Chief Justice Rehnquist might have more success at marshalling a unified Court than would Justice Stevens. Justice
Rehnquist had years to cultivate the relationships and leadership skills
to build coalitions, while Justice Stevens was unexpectedly thrust into
the role of Acting Chief Justice. Table 1 reports the percentage of
unanimous opinions and the percentage of decisions that turned on a
single vote during the respective tenures of Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Acting Chief Justice Stevens during the 2004 Term.
Table 1: Court Cohesion Under Two Leaders, 2004 Term
Cohesion

Rehnquist Chief

Stevens Acting Chief

Unanimous
One-Vote Majority
N=70.

.43
.20

.40
.30

Chief Justice Rehnquist did slightly better on these cohesiveness
measures than did Justice Stevens, as hypothesized. The magnitude of
the difference was not great, however, so no confident conclusions
can be reached about the change in Chief Justice on Court cohesion.
Although the foregoing analysis is not dispositive, other hypotheses about the 2004 Term centered on the ideological direction of the
Court’s decisions. Some suggested that upon becoming Acting Chief
Justice, Justice Stevens effectively took control and drove the Court in
112

Posting of Todd Zywicki to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/
1123540096.shtml (Aug. 8, 2005, 6:28 EST).
113
125 S. Ct. 2088, 2089 (2005).
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a liberal direction. There is little doubt that Justices Stevens and
Rehnquist differed ideologically and commonly found themselves opposed in close cases. To test for the effect of the Chief Justice on outcomes, therefore, we simply compare the number of cases in which
Justices Rehnquist and Stevens dissented from the majority during
114
each of their tenures as Chief Justice.
If the Chief Justice were indeed influential in determining outcomes, through agenda setting or
other measures, one would expect that the Justice would be in dissent
less often while serving as Chief Justice. Table 2 reports the results as
the percentage of cases in which each of the Justices dissented, by the
cases in which they served as Chief Justice.
Table 2: Dissent Behavior by Two Leaders, 2004 Term
Behavior

Rehnquist Chief

Stevens Acting Chief

Rehnquist Dissent
Stevens Dissent

.100
.300

.275
.250

The results definitely conform to the hypothesis about the influence of the Chief Justice. Justice Rehnquist’s dissents rose dramatically during the period when Justice Stevens was Acting Chief. Moreover, these numbers likely understate the effect because they
incorporate some cases in which Justice Rehnquist did not participate
(and therefore could not dissent), including at least one case in which
115
a dissent by Justice Rehnquist seems likely to have occurred.
The
effect on Justice Stevens’s dissents was not so dramatic but was also in
the expected direction.
The test of the 2004 Term is intriguing but far from conclusive.
The sample size is small and too many relevant explanatory variables
are thus beyond realistic control. The findings could be attributed,
for example, to the different set of cases on the docket during the
times that Justices Rehnquist and Stevens served as Chief. Nevertheless, this natural experiment does provide some suggestive evidence

114

According to our coding conventions, the Justice was considered a dissenter if
he dissented from any part of the majority opinion.
115
Most of the cases in which Justice Rehnquist did not participate were fairly uncontroversial, but Small v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1752 (2005), was a criminal case decided on a 5-3 vote, with Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Kennedy as dissenters. Had Justice Rehnquist participated in and dissented from this ruling, his dissent percentage
under Acting Chief Justice Stevens would rise to 30%, or three times the rate at which
he dissented while serving as Chief.
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about the authority of the Chief Justice by indicating that the presiding Chief Justice may have considerable influence on outcomes. In
the following Part, we test this theory on a much larger set of data
116
provided by the Spaeth U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database.
III. BROADER EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE’S INFLUENCE
The Supreme Court Database includes variables reflecting the
ideological direction of Justices’ votes, the nature and number of the
cases taken by the Court, the decision of the full Court and votes of
individual Justices, and many other items of interest. This Part embarks on some preliminary empirical analysis regarding the influence
of the Chief Justice. To do so, we focus on the transition from Justice
Rehnquist’s service as Associate Justice (1972-1985 Terms) to his service as Chief (1986-2004 Terms), exploring the effect of the transition
on Supreme Court decisions as well as on Justice Rehnquist’s behavior
individually. In this sense, we seek to evaluate the notion that “[o]ne
indicator of the power of a chief justice is how much things can
117
change at the Court when a new chief takes office.”
Comparing transitions as a measure of the Chief Justice’s power
and authority, as we do here, has theoretical and practical limitations,
however. Suppose that a powerful and effective conservative Chief
Justice was replaced by a new powerful and effective conservative
Chief Justice. The measure of the transition effect in such a case
would be null, but this would not disprove the influence of the Chief
Justice. It would only show that the succeeding Chief Justice was
comparable to the predecessor. If the transition did mark a change in
the Court’s decisional outcomes, however, it would provide more persuasive evidence of the Chief’s influence. Moreover, studying the elevation of Chief Justice Rehnquist might be expected to produce such
an effect if it has the potential to exist. The Court under Chief Justice
Burger was rife with confusion and contentiousness. In contrast,
Chief Justice Rehnquist was a more able administrator, who was able

116

The United States Supreme Court Judicial Database is a multi-user database
that provides detailed data, including ideological direction, on Supreme Court decisions since the start of the Warren Court. Harold J. Spaeth, The S. Sidney Ulmer Project: U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Databases, http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/
sctdata.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
117
Mauro, supra note 2, at 10.
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to create a more collegial decision-making environment.
Although
Justice Rehnquist is regarded as more conservative than Justice Burger, the liberals on the Court generously praised his new leadership
119
regime.
Thus, if the Chief Justice’s leadership matters, one might
expect it to appear in a study of this transition. Justice Rehnquist’s
relatively lengthy service as both an Associate Justice and then as Chief
Justice facilitates this comparison.
Such transition testing is a very rough measure, of course. Justice
Rehnquist was elevated to Chief Justice at the same time that Justice
Scalia joined the Court. Consequently, any change with the transition
might be due to Justice Scalia’s influence, or the interactive combination of Justices Scalia and Rehnquist, rather than to the Chief Justice
120
effect alone.
In addition, the transition period itself is not precise.
The new Chief’s “leadership style” will “take[] time to develop” and
“some period of adjustment is inherent in the chief’s development of
strategies necessary to ‘marshall’ the Court and for the Court to effec121
tively respond to his leadership style.” If so, the effects of a Chief on
Court decisions would appear only after a lag period. Finally, since we
look at trends over time, a number of additional variables could confound the analysis. For example, we evaluate Justice Rehnquist’s propensity to concur over the two periods. His decreased inclination to
concur as Chief Justice, as we observe it in the data, could be the result of his enhanced interest in cohesion on the Court, or it could be
due to the Court’s shift to the right—obviating the need for Justice
Rehnquist, a conservative, to present an alternative perspective.

118

See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text (referring to some of the multiple
commentators who have remarked on the relative influence of Justice Rehnquist on
the Court).
119
Justice Stevens expressed “sincere appreciation for the exemplary way in
which . . . [Chief Justice Rehnquist] performed the special responsibilities of [his] high
office, with particular emphasis on the efficiency, good humor and absolute impartiality that [he] . . . consistently displayed when presiding at our conferences.” Greenhouse, supra note 8, at A16. The transitional effect is described in O’BRIEN, supra note
13, at 203-04; see also BAUM, supra note 3, at 166-68 (discussing Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s ability to be a more effective leader of the Court than was Chief Justice
Burger). Indeed, some have considered Justice Rehnquist a “dominant” Chief, though
others have suggested that his Court was truly controlled by its “swing justices.” Garnett, supra note 17, at 34.
120
Prior research has shown different voting patterns on civil liberties cases in different Courts (for example, the Warren Court, the Burger Court, and the Rehnquist
Court), but has attributed this to the ideological composition of different Courts,
rather than a Chief Justice effect. See Lawrence Baum, Membership Change and Collective
Voting Change in the United States Supreme Court, 54 J. POL. 3, 10-21 (1992).
121
Haynie, supra note 105, at 1161-62 (citation omitted).
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Nevertheless, analysis of trends is suggestive and can serve as the
basis for future empirical research that may tease out these underlying
relationships. In this Part, therefore, we present a preliminary empirical analysis on the effects of the Chief Justice on Supreme Court
decisions, focusing on Chief Justice Rehnquist. We begin with an
analysis of Justice voting and case outcomes. While Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s leadership does not appear to dramatically affect ideological outcomes overall, this Part examines whether Justice Rehnquist
successfully achieved other objectives. We examine his effect on the
neutral goals of Court cohesion and on the cases taken for the Court’s
docket. Finally, we examine the Rehnquist Court’s record on “judicial
activism,” for which the Court has commonly been criticized. The
evidence suggests that Chief Justice Rehnquist may indeed have had
some impact on the Court’s decisionmaking, although future multivariate analysis would provide additional evidence of such an effect.
A. Chief Justice Effects on Case Votes and Cohesion
This Part presents data on the effect of Justice Rehnquist’s elevation to Chief Justice on case outcomes. Justice Rehnquist is certainly a
conservative, so one might expect him to try to drive judicial decisions
in a conservative direction. Keith Whittington’s summary of Justice
Rehnquist’s service conceded that while he did not fully realize this
jurisprudential goal in case outcomes overall, Justice Rehnquist did
122
lead “a revitalized strand of judicial conservatism.” For Whittington,
it “seems clear that the chief justice has directed the Court toward a
123
different destination.”
If so, his service might be expected to have
produced an increased percentage of conservative decisions, or, conversely, a decreased percentage of liberal outcomes over the period.
This effect can be measured by evaluating the directional outcome for
cases by Term. Figure 1 presents the percentage of liberal decisions
124
in criminal procedure and civil liberties cases from 1972 to 2004.
122

Keith E. Whittington, William H. Rehnquist: Nixon’s Strict Constructionist, Reagan’s
Chief Justice, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 8, 8 (Earl
M. Maltz ed., 2003).
123
Id. at 27.
124
For this and all other analyses, we used case citation as the unit of analysis and
omitted cases decided with memorandum opinions or decrees. The coding conventions used to identify the ideological direction of the case outcomes are available at
HAROLD J. SPAETH, S. SIDNEY ULMER PROJECT FOR RESEARCH IN LAW AND JUDICIAL PROJECTS, THE ORIGINAL UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL DATABASE: 1953-2003
TERMS:
DOCUMENTATION (2005), http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/
allcourt_codebook.pdf.
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Figure 1: Percent Liberal Outcomes in Criminal Procedure
and Civil Liberties Decisions
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Figure 1 displays little trend toward more conservative decisions
by the Supreme Court over the period, either in criminal procedure
or civil liberties cases. Indeed, given the fact that Justice Scalia joined
the Court in 1986 and was soon joined by Justice Thomas, it may be
surprising that the Court did not shift even further in a conservative
direction over the time period covered in the figure. When considering these findings, there is no reason to believe that Justice
Rehnquist’s tenure as Chief drove the Court to produce more conservative case outcomes. The Rehnquist Court certainly has not broadly
rolled back the liberal precedents of the Warren Court, and the pe125
riod has been called “The Revolution that Wasn’t.”
The data on case outcomes may simply be too unrefined to identify an ideological effect. They show nothing about the content of the
opinions issued by the Court or the content of the cases taken on certiorari. In some major issue areas, the Court clearly has become more

Note that Justice Rehnquist joined the Court in 1972 and became Chief Justice in
1986.
125
M. Elizabeth Magill, The Revolution that Wasn’t, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 47 (2004).
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conservative. For example, the Rehnquist Court has plainly limited
126
the availability of habeas corpus.
The shift from the governing rule
127
for abortion restrictions in Roe v. Wade to the governing rule in Ca128
129
sey clearly reflects a movement away from reproductive rights,
though it fell far short of the reversal of Roe that conservatives sought.
Such examples, however, cannot illustrate any distinct effect of Chief
Justice Rehnquist. Nor do these quantitative results provide any information on the nonideological components of decisions, such as
Court cohesion. The remainder of this Article embarks on an investigation of whether the transition from Chief Justice Burger to Chief
Justice Rehnquist is associated with changes in other measures of Supreme Court decisionmaking.
We begin with an analysis of Court cohesion. One conventional
view of Court dynamics is purely ideological, as evidenced by the
analyses of Justice voting. But at least theoretically, the Chief is likely
to be concerned with other institutional considerations that are nonideological in nature. One such consideration is the extent to which
the Justices render decisions that are unmarred by dissenting or concurring opinions. Such cohesive decisionmaking can influence the
power of opinions rendered by the Court, shape lower courts’ implementation of those opinions, and affect the Court’s legitimacy in the
130
public eye.
Some commentators have suggested that Chief Justice
Rehnquist was a failure at building Court consensus. Thus, arguably
the “norm of individual opinions may have grown even stronger un131
der Chief Justice Rehnquist.”
Others have even described the
132
Rehnquist Court as fragmented.
126

See Davis, supra note 12, at 143 (describing Rehnquist’s “victory in reducing habeas corpus”).
127
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
128
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
129
See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 124
(1999) (reporting that Casey “made it substantially easier for the states to adopt regulations restricting the availability of abortion”).
130
Majority opinions with the support of more Justices tend to have greater power
as precedents and may benefit the Court in other ways as well. See, e.g., Cross, supra
note 51, at 554-57 (discussing the potential value of larger majorities in their potential
to give “compelling force” to the result); see also supra notes 81-89 and accompanying
text. Unanimous opinions may be especially important to the influence of Supreme
Court opinions; see also MURPHY, supra note 13, at 66 (declaring that “[t]he greater the
majority, the greater the appearance of certainty and the more likely a decision will be
accepted and followed in similar cases”).
131
Davis, supra note 12, at 144.
132
Cornell Clayton, Law, Politics, and the Rehnquist Court: Structural Influences on
Supreme Court Decision Making, in THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 151, 161-
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Our analysis considers both the behavior of Chief Justice
Rehnquist himself and of the Court under his leadership. The following figures reflect trends in the Court’s decisions as well as those of
Chief Justice Rehnquist, before and after his elevation to Chief. These
trends display both the immediate effect of the Rehnquist Court and
its gradual effect over time. We begin by studying Justice Rehnquist’s
individual voting behavior and whether becoming Chief Justice affected his willingness to write separately. Figure 2 presents the frequency with which Justice Rehnquist voted with the majority, with
separate data points and trend lines for his time as an Associate and as
Chief Justice.
Figure 2: Rehnquist Votes with Majority
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162 (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton eds., 1999); see also Timothy Sandefur, The
Rehnquist Legacy, LIBERTY, Nov. 2005, at 25, available at http://libertyunbound.com/
archive/2005_11/sandefur-rehnquist.html (characterizing the Rehnquist Court as
“fractured” and discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s inability to achieve consensus).
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These results show a distinct change in Justice Rehnquist’s behavior following his elevation to Chief Justice. Although no apparent
trend existed in his interest in filing or joining an independent opinion before he was elevated, thereafter it appears that he became more
inclined to join the majority opinion. Before becoming Chief, Justice
Rehnquist voted in the majority around eighty percent of the time. As
Chief, he voted with the majority over eighty-five percent of the time.
In some years, as an Associate Justice, he felt free to refuse to join the
majority over twenty-five percent of the time. As a Chief, his highest
rate of refusing to join the majority was seventeen percent. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s disinclination to express himself in an independent
opinion is particularly apparent when one examines his rate of con133
curring opinions over the period.
It is therefore possible that institutional features of the chief justiceship had an effect on Justice Rehnquist’s independent voting behavior. While he continued to dissent on occasion, the rate of such
action dropped. At the margin, it appears that he was more willing to
sacrifice his ability to express his own distinctive views in exchange for
a larger majority. This is suggestive of the “golden shackles” argument
134
that being Chief limits a Justice’s freedom.
There is, however, an
alternative explanation. When in the majority at conference, the
Chief can designate the opinion writer, a potentially strategic and
empowering effect. Chief Justice Rehnquist may have joined more
majorities in order to possess this assignment power and thereby influence the content of the resulting opinion. Information on conference voting could help distinguish these explanations, but we lack
that data. It is also possible that when the Court’s membership
changed with the addition of Justices Scalia and Thomas, Justice
Rehnquist more often found himself in a conservative majority. This,
too, would explain a reduction in his propensity to dissent.
The next analysis considers whether becoming Chief Justice affected the probability that Justice Rehnquist would concur. If the
Chief votes with the majority at conference, she may both assign the
majority opinion and file a concurring opinion that expresses her
views more precisely. Thus, she could control the opinion assignment
and still fulfill her expressive interests in opinion writing by later filing
a separate concurring opinion. Figure 4 presents the rates at which

133
134

See infra figure 3.
See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
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Justice Rehnquist filed concurring opinions over the years, with separate trend lines for his service as Associate Justice and as Chief Justice.
Figure 3: Rehnquist Concurs as Associate and Chief
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These results show that the probability of a Rehnquist concurrence declined after he became Chief Justice. This finding suggests
some increased concern for Court cohesion on his part after becoming Chief Justice. Although Chief Justice Rehnquist continued to file
concurring opinions, he did so four percent of the time or less in the
vast majority of years. By contrast, as an Associate, he filed concurring
opinions four percent of the time or more in every year but his first.
The above evidence on Justice Rehnquist’s concurrences is not
terribly dramatic. The absolute number of fewer concurrences is not
great, averaging only one or two fewer concurrences per year following Justice Rehnquist’s elevation to Chief. Moreover, this only contributes to cohesion in his own vote and illustrates only the “golden
shackles” theory of being Chief Justice. Ideally, we think that a Chief
Justice could use her power to induce greater consensus among the
other members of the Court. This requires consideration of the behavior of the Court as a whole and whether it appeared to change following the transition from Chief Justice Burger to Chief Justice
Rehnquist. Data on the frequency of overall concurrences are presented in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Decisions with Concurrence
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The break in the trend lines here suggests that Chief Justice
Rehnquist may have had some effect on Court cohesion generally.
Concurrences were steadily increasing during the Burger Court but
that trend was stalled in the time period of the Rehnquist Court. The
break was not as dramatic as it was for Justice Rehnquist’s individual
behavior, which might be expected—he had to steadily learn his role
as Chief Justice and how to influence other Justices to join a majority
opinion. Once again, the effect is not a highly dramatic one, as the
overall rate of concurrences declined only slightly. The possible influence of Chief Justice Rehnquist on dissent is considered in Figure
5. This figure displays the number of decisions with at least one dissent, the converse of a unanimous opinion.
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Figure 5: Decisions with Dissent
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This figure suggests that dissents may have been on the decline
even before Justice Rehnquist became Chief, and that trend clearly
continued after he obtained the position.
The circumstances of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s tenure do not provide a perfect natural experiment because other intervening factors
that cannot be controlled may explain the differences in Court cohesion. Perhaps the most obvious and significant intervening factor, the
addition of Justice Scalia, suggests that our data may understate the
positive effect of Chief Justice Rehnquist on Court cohesion. Justice
Scalia has the highest probability of any recent Justice of filing a spe135
cial concurrence; he also files a significant number of dissents.
On
the other hand, the Court may have become more cohesive over the
period after the retirements of Justices Brennan and Marshall, who
were far more liberal than any of the Justices who later joined the
Court. Thus, a decrease in the range of ideological preferences associated with the individual Justices could also account for this apparent
increase in Court cohesion. Indeed, to the extent that Justice
Rehnquist moderated his own behavior after becoming Chief, it would
have affected the mean of the Court as a whole.

135

SEGAL ET AL., supra note 42, at 336 tbl.13.1.
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One final important measure of cohesion is found in the number
of plurality opinions. The presence of such an opinion reflects some
level of failure by the Supreme Court. While such opinions resolve
the case before the Court, the lack of a governing majority opinion
leaves the law in a state of uncertainty. The plurality opinion’s “authority as a precedent, as a guide to the decisions of other courts, is
136
severely compromised.”
Thus, it is in the Court’s interest to limit
the number of plurality opinions. Figure 6 shows the trend in plurality opinions during Justice Rehnquist’s tenure on the Court.
Figure 6: Plurality Opinions, 1972-2004
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Again we see a remarkable change in the number of plurality
opinions over the period analyzed. This result could be attributed to
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s marshalling of the Court, or it could be due
to the decrease in the size of the Court’s docket over the same period.
These results show some pronounced differences in Justice
Rehnquist’s behavior after becoming Chief and also some modest cohesion differences between the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. It is
136

Id. at 335; see generally John F. Davis & William L. Reynolds, Juridical Cripples:
Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59, 62 (explaining that plurality
opinions “may compromise [the Court’s] professional and public acceptance,” carry
“less precedential weight,” and “often fail[] to give definitive guidance as to the state of
the law”).
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impossible to conclusively assign these differences to Justice
Rehnquist’s elevation to Chief, as Justice Scalia joined the Court at the
same time. The results are suggestive, however, and they are generally
consistent with scholarly opinion on the effect of Chief Justice
Rehnquist. It appears that Chief Justice Rehnquist effectively discharged his managerial responsibility in achieving increased Court
cohesion.
B. Chief Justice Effects on Case Selection
As discussed above, the Chief Justice has some unique ability to influence the cases chosen for Court review, and one might expect
more of an effect here than on case outcomes.
The first analysis considers simply the absolute number of cases
taken by the Court.
Figure 7: Decisions with Written Opinion, 1972-2004
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The results are striking. The Rehnquist Court was widely known
for managing a significantly smaller docket than the Burger Court.
Another issue involves the types of cases on which the Court accepts certiorari; a Chief Justice can direct the course of the law simply
through the types of cases the Court selects for review. Case types can
be broken down in various ways; we begin the analysis by examining
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broad case categories. We first graph the number of cases taken each
year in two important areas—criminal procedure and civil rights and
liberties. Figure 8 displays the percentage of the docket devoted to
these issue areas for each of the years of Justice Rehnquist’s service on
the Supreme Court.
Figure 8: Docket Composition, 1971-2004
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Here we see no significant change in the Court’s docket, at least
with respect to these broad issue categories. There appears to be a
slight increase in criminal procedure cases as a percentage of the
docket, but, given the shrinking size of the docket, the Rehnquist
Court took fewer criminal procedure cases in absolute numbers than
did the Burger Court. The Court’s attention to these key legal issues
has obviously varied over the years, but there is no clear and dramatic
pattern of change in broad priorities during the tenure of Chief Justice Rehnquist.
In terms of more narrow issue areas, Chief Justice Rehnquist is associated with concern for federalism and the protection of states’ legal
137
rights.
His success in this regard has been called the “Rehnquist

137

See Davis, supra note 12, at 142 (observing that the “overarching theme of
Rehnquist’s decision-making is state-centered federalism”).
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Court’s Velvet Revolution,” with commentators noting that Chief
Justice Rehnquist was “most successful in reinvigorating interest in
139
federalism on the Court.”
His tenure is also associated with a con140
cern over the expansion of judicial power.
One might expect this
preference to appear in the cases that his Court selected for certiorari.
Figure 9 reports the percentage of the docket devoted to cases involving federalism, interstate relations, and judicial power during Justice
Rehnquist’s tenure on the Supreme Court.
Figure 9: Docket Composition:
Federalism/Judicial Power/Interstate Relations
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Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court’s Federalism
Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477, 496 (2001).
139
Whittington, supra note 122, at 23.
140
See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt, Wrong, but Not Too Right, LEGAL AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2005,
at 36 (noting that as Chief Justice, Justice Rehnquist appeared more concerned with
expanding judicial power than producing conservative outcomes).
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The results show an upward trend in the docket percentage of
cases in these issue areas taken by the Supreme Court, though the
trend appears to have begun before Justice Rehnquist became Chief
Justice, and the magnitude of the change is not great. Moreover, because of the shrunken docket, the absolute number of federalism
cases is fewer than for many years of the Burger Court. These pure
quantitative measures do not capture the full story, however. The
Rehnquist Court has seen the issuance of some of the potentially most
141
significant federalism decisions, such as United States v. Lopez.
The
Court’s pro-federalism decisions are not entirely consistent or farreaching, however, and an analysis of the decisions has found their ef142
fects to be relatively pragmatic and minimalist.
Another important consideration in the makeup of the Supreme
Court docket is the resolution of circuit court conflicts. To the extent
that Chief Justice Rehnquist and his Court were more concerned with
the Court’s responsibility to resolve such conflicts, they may have chosen more intercircuit conflicts to resolve as a percentage of the overall
docket. Figure 10 displays the percentage of docket cases that involved intercircuit conflicts.
Figure 10: Intercircuit Conflicts Cases as
Percent of Overall Docket
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Once again, we see a striking change associated with the
Rehnquist Court. The percentage of the docket devoted to conflicts
cases nearly doubled over levels in the Burger Court. This change did
not reflect a particular commitment to reducing circuit conflicts,
however. The absolute number of conflicts resolved by the Rehnquist
Court was fewer than in some years of the Burger Court. Instead, the
higher percentages reflect the reduced docket of the Rehnquist Court
years. In 1973, when less than twenty percent of the docket involved
conflicts cases, the Court resolved thirty conflicts. By contrast, in
2003, when conflicts cases made up about a third of the docket, the
Court resolved only twenty-five conflicts. The remarkable change in
the percentage of the Court’s docket taken up by conflicts cases is a
result of the lesser number of nonconflicts cases accepted by the
Rehnquist Court.
The results demonstrate that the Rehnquist Court remained reasonably attentive to the need to resolve circuit court conflicts, as have
prior Courts, but showed much less interest in taking cases without
circuit conflicts. This is a curious phenomenon, without an obvious
explanation. One would think that the nonconflicts cases enable the
Justices to choose the issues that interest them and on which they wish
to make law. These discretionary choices would seem to be at the root
of the Court’s power, yet the Rehnquist Court limited them drastically. Such an action might reflect a commitment to reduce the
Court’s power in the U.S. governmental system, perhaps in response
to attacks on judicial activism. The next Part considers the Rehnquist
Court and such judicial activism.
C. Chief Justice Effects on Judicial Activism
One of the more common critiques of the recent Rehnquist Court
is that it was an activist Court. Cass Sunstein declared that “[w]e are
now in the midst of a remarkable period of right-wing judicial activ143
ism.”
Similarly, Larry Kramer has contended that “conservative ju144
dicial activism is the order of the day,” while others have called the
Court’s federalism doctrine “an astonishing display of judicial activism
142
143

See Clayton, supra note 132, at 171-75.
Cass R. Sunstein, Op-Ed, Tilting the Scales Rightward, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2001,

at A23.
144

Larry D. Kramer, Op-Ed, No Surprise. It’s an Activist Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
2000, at A33. Professor Kramer has also referred to the “unparalleled activism” of the
Rehnquist Court. Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 959, 960 (2004).
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145

not seen since the 1930s.”
Yet in many ways, the concept of judicial
activism has become more of an epithet than a thought. It often
means nothing more than reference to “an action taken by a court of
146
which the speaker disapproves.”
Conservatives declaimed the judicial activism of the Warren Court, which liberals embraced, only to
find their ideological positions reversed as the Court became more
conservative.
Even if activism is generally empty of meaning other than ideological disagreement, one can still measure certain elements commonly associated with such activism on their own terms. A commonly
invoked measure of judicial activism is the Court’s willingness to invalidate statutes. While this is not a perfect or complete measure of
147
activism, it surely has a rough accuracy, because striking down legislation is a clear flexing of judicial power at the expense of another
148
branch of government. Richard Posner has suggested that he would
like to see this metric for activism become “canonical,” because it involves courts “acting contrary to the will of the other branches of gov149
ernment.”
Ernest Young concedes that these are the “most dra150
matic instances” of judicial activism. Most of the past decisions cited
as “activist” involved the invalidation of a statute, whether it be an anti145

Herman Schwartz, Introduction to THE REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
RIGHT 13, 19 (Herman Schwartz ed., 2002). Jonathan Molot details the
Rehnquist Court’s activism, reviewing the Court’s record in terms of countermajoritarian decisions and adherence to neutral principles. Jonathan T. Molot, Principled
Minimalism: Restriking the Balance Between Judicial Minimalism and Neutral Principles, 90
VA. L. REV. 1753, 1806-25 (2004).
146
Randy E. Barnett, Is the Rehnquist Court an “Activist” Court?: The Commerce Clause
Cases, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (2002).
147
See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1139, 1164-70 (2002) (addressing the concept of judicial activism and critiquing an excessive focus on statutory invalidation as the measure of activism). Young
suggests consideration of other forms of judicial activism, including departing from
text or history, departing from precedent, issuing maximalist rulings, exercising broad
remedial powers, and deciding ideologically. Id. at 1144; see also Keenan D. Kmiec, The
Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activism,” 92 CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1463-76 (2004)
(reviewing different definitions of judicial activism, including statutory invalidations
and definitions that ignore precedent, departures from interpretive methodology, and
results-oriented judging).
148
See BAUM, supra note 3, at 194 (“Of the various forms of judicial activism, perhaps the most important is making decisions that conflict with policies of the other
branches. This form of activisim is often gauged by the Court’s use of judicial review,
its power to overturn acts of other policy makers on the ground that they violate the
Constitution.”).
149
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 320
(1996).
150
Young, supra note 147, at 1145.
ON THE
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151

abortion law in Roe or the Violence Against Women Act in Morri152
son . In addition, this measure has the advantages of being ideologically neutral and readily quantifiable and has been used as a proxy in
153
other research.
Critics of the Rehnquist Court have claimed that it has been all
too ready to presume power for itself and strike down statutes. In
their view, Chief Justice Rehnquist is an activist who is quick to overrule the judgments of legislatures. Standing opposite this stereotype,
however, is Justice Rehnquist’s own judicial philosophy, which is “mistrustful of judges substituting their judgments of contested constitu154
tional rights for the judgments of popularly elected representatives.”
By this philosophy, one might expect Chief Justice Rehnquist, and the
Court that he led, to be loathe to strike down statutes. This is a controversy that may be readily tested.
As noted above, many have argued that the conservative
Rehnquist Court was not true to its professed philosophy of judicial
restraint, and some have supported this claim with modest empirical
analyses. In a controversial editorial, Paul Gewirtz and Chad Golder
examined the Justice’s votes and found that on the Rehnquist Court,
conservatives such as Justices Scalia and Thomas were most willing to
155
strike down federal statutes.
Stuart Taylor observed that between
1994 and 2000, the Court invalidated twenty-three federal statutes, af156
ter it had invalidated only 128 in its entire prior history.
To amplify this research, we compare statutory invalidations in the
Rehnquist Court with those in the Burger Court, beginning with an
analysis of federal statutes. We used the Supreme Court database to
identify all cases heard by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts during
the 1971 to 2000 Terms in which the constitutionality of a statute was
challenged on its face (as opposed to applied challenges), for all deci157
sion types except memorandum decisions and decrees.
The num-

151

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
153
See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Thoughts on Goldilocks and Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO
ST. L.J. 195, 213-17 (2003) (using statutory invalidations as measure to test activism associated with different state court selection methods).
154
Whittington, supra note 122, at 16.
155
Paul Gewirtz & Chad Golder, Op-Ed, So Who Are the Activists?, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,
2005, at A19.
156
Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Tipping Point, NAT’L J., June 10, 2000, at 1810, 1816.
157
To execute this, we first used the “uncon” variable in the Supreme Court Database to find cases in which a statute or ordinance was found unconstitutional. We then
used the “authdec” variable in the database to identify all cases where there might have
152
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bers are relatively small and are displayed in Figure 11 as a histogram
showing the absolute number of facial challenges considered each
year and the number of statutes invalidated as facially unconstitutional.
Figure 11: Judicial Activism: Invalidation of Federal Statutes
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These results show some difference between the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts. The Rehnquist Court was somewhat more likely to
strike down federal statutes than its predecessor. The most remarkable change is the reduced number of challenges to statutes’ constitutionality that the Court accepts. The Rehnquist Court takes certiorari
on very few challenges, save for cases in which it strikes down the statute, in contrast to the Burger Court, which took many more challenges and issued fewer invalidations. While this is in part a function
of the smaller docket of the Rehnquist Court as well as of changes in
the Court’s jurisdictional statute in 1988, the difference exceeds even
the reduction in the docket. The Rehnquist Court seemed to be very
reluctant to uphold the constitutionality of a statute. In three of these
years (1993, 1994, and 1997), the Court upheld no federal statutes

been a constitutional challenge to the statute and then examined the opinion to determine whether this was in fact the case. Spaeth, supra note 116.
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and in several other years (1988, 1990, 1995, and 1996) it upheld only
one. Table 3 provides mean statistics on federal statutory constitutionality rulings during the periods when Justice Rehnquist was an Associate Justice on the Burger Court and when he was the Chief Justice.
Table 3: Mean Federal Laws Challenged and Invalidated Per Term

Federal Laws
Challenged
Federal Laws
Invalidated

Associate Justice
Rehnquist

Chief Justice
Rehnquist

5.875

4.26

1.125

1.86

While the number of challenged statutes dropped significantly in
the Rehnquist Court, the number of statutory invalidations increased
distinctly. The increased absolute number of statutory invalidations
shows a greater measure of judicial activism by the Court, especially
when one considers the smaller docket of the Rehnquist Court. The
reduced number of challenges is an interesting and somewhat curious
finding that requires further exploration. While due in part to the
smaller docket, it may also be that the Court sought to allow the circuit courts to consider questions of federal statute constitutionality
and to strike down their decisions as it saw fit in some future opin158
ion.
Much of the discussion of Rehnquist Court activism has considered only federal statutes. This can be misleading, as many of the
Court’s past decisions that are considered the most activist struck
down state statutes. The critiques of Rehnquist Court activism have
almost exclusively addressed its rulings on federal statutes, which ar159
guably reveal an implicit and “strong ideological bias.”
To consider
the level of activism in striking down state laws, Figure 12 considers
the number of constitutional challenges to and invalidations of state
statutes while Rehnquist was a Justice.

158

The docket size reduction is not independent of this effect. Indeed, the
Court’s reluctance to take cases in which it would uphold federal statutes could explain some of the docket reduction.
159
Young, supra note 147, at 1146 n.20.
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Figure 12: Judicial Activism:
State Laws Challenged and Invalidated, 1972-2000
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This figure shows a steadily declining number of state statutes
challenged and invalidated as facially unconstitutional. The decline is
especially pronounced in the Rehnquist Court years. While Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Court was clearly more activist with respect to striking
down federal statutes, it was much less activist with respect to invalidation of state statutes. This provides clearer evidence of its commitment to federalism. Table 4 provides mean statistics on state statute
constitutionality rulings during the periods when Justice Rehnquist
was an Associate Justice in the Burger Court and when he was the
Chief Justice.
Table 4: Mean State Laws Challenged and Invalidated Per Term

State Laws Challenged
State Laws Invalidated

Associate Justice
Rehnquist

Chief Justice
Rehnquist

20.18
9.875

9.46
4.33

Here we see a remarkable decline in the number of constitutional
challenges to state statutes and the number of invalidations of those

1706

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 154: 1665

statutes, a reduction that exceeds the size of the overall docket reduction. The reduction in annual invalidations is significant and understates the effect of the change, because each of those decisions serves
as a precedent to be followed by lower courts. The Rehnquist Court
was much more deferential to state legislatures than were its predecessors. Statutory invalidation decisions may thus provide stronger evidence of the Court’s states’ rights orientation than do even the federalism decisions themselves.
After suggesting that Justice Rehnquist was committed to judicial
restraint, Keith Whittington went on to observe that the Rehnquist
Court has indeed sought to use the judicial power to limit the government, but “less by carving out particular preferred freedoms than
by imposing new obstacles on the exercise of central government au160
thority.”
This suggestion is consistent with its pattern of striking
down more federal statutes and fewer state statutes than the Burger
Court. This is a different sort of activism that constrains federal government power, but not through the Bill of Rights. The Rehnquist
Court was clearly less activist toward state legislation and more activist
in striking down federal legislation.
Our measure of judicial activism is an imperfect one. Not all statutes are of equal societal significance, so strikes of statutes are not
equivalent. However, the data suggest that the Rehnquist Court was
more activist in striking down federal statutes, often on federalism
grounds, and much less activist in striking down state statutes under
the Bill of Rights. This change represents not so much greater or
lesser activism on the whole, but a shift in the constitutional interest
of the Court from the Amendments to the Articles and the structural
makeup of the U.S. government, a shift in favor of state power. It
seems fair to attribute much of this change to Justice Rehnquist’s role
as Chief, because these are the issues with which he is associated.
CONCLUSION
There is surely no universal association between the Chief Justice’s
unique sources of authority and the Chief’s decisional power on the
Court. Some have been more primus and others more pares. Yet the
historical record may enable us to identify the potential power of the
Chief Justice at the Court. Chief Justice Rehnquist himself declared
that “the Chief Justice has placed in his hands some of the tools which

160

Whittington, supra note 122, at 27.
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will enable him to be primus among the pares but his stature will de161
pend on how he uses them.” This Article provides some evidence of
how Chief Justice Rehnquist used those tools.
Our results are necessarily tentative and preliminary, as they have
not conclusively isolated a Chief Justice effect. However, they do provide insight into an understudied area of the law. The Chief Justice
remains but one vote among nine, and Chief Justice Rehnquist had
little effect driving the Court in an overall conservative direction or
reversing the Warren Court’s liberal precedents. But our results suggest that Justice Rehnquist’s service as Chief Justice did have some effect on the Court’s product, both institutionally and in the content of
its decisional output.
Much additional research should be conducted on this topic. We
have analyzed the effect of Chief Justice Rehnquist, but there is a
wealth of historical information that would permit comparable studies
of prior transitions of the chief justiceship. Other than the change in
individual opinion writing, attributed to Chief Justice Hughes, very little of this work has been done. It may well be that some primi have
been much more effective than others, and some have been thoroughly ineffective. Such discoveries could considerably inform future
judgments about who should be appointed and confirmed to the position.

161

William H. Rehnquist, Lecture, Remarks of the Chief Justice: My Life in the Law
Series, 52 DUKE L.J. 787, 805 (2003).

